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HEADQUARTERS, U. S. AFRICA COMMAND
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~~(U)~~ ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

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~~(U)~~ References:

- a. ~~(U)~~ U.S. Africa Command Theater Campaign Plan 7000-12, 25 Jan 2012, ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~
- b. ~~(U)~~ National Security Strategy, May 2010 ~~(U)~~
- c. ~~(U)~~ U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, June 2012 ~~(U)~~
- d. ~~(U)~~ National Defense Strategy, June 2008 ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~
- e. ~~(U)~~ National Military Strategy, 8 February 2011 ~~(S)~~
- f. ~~(U)~~ Unified Command Plan (UCP), 6 April 2011 ~~(U//FOUO)~~
- g. ~~(U)~~ 2010 Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 9 April 2011 ~~(S)~~
- h. (U) Guidance for Development of the Force, Fiscal Years 2011-2015, 28 Jul 2009 ~~(S)~~
- i. ~~(U)~~ Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Department of Defense, 10 June 2011 ~~(S)~~
- j. ~~(U)~~ U.S. Africa Command Theater Strategy 2011-2016: A Strategy for Security and Stability in Africa, September 2011 ~~(S)~~
- k. ~~(U)~~ U.S. European Command Theater Posture Plan, July 2011 ~~(S)~~
- l. ~~(U)~~ Joint Publication 1-02 ~~(U)~~
- m. ~~(U)~~ U.S. Transportation Command En Route Infrastructure Master Plan 2012, 28 February 2012
- n. ~~(U)~~ 2012 U.S. Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, March 2012 ~~(S)~~
- o. ~~(U)~~ Global Preposition Material Capabilities Study (GPMCS), 2010 ~~(S//NF)~~
- p. ~~(U)~~ U.S. Africa Command Instruction 4300.04, Cooperative Security Location, 28 September 2010 ~~(U)~~

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Executive Summary

1. ~~(U)~~ The FY13 United States (U.S.) Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Theater Posture Plan (TPP) links command priorities to the Guidance for Employment of the Force end states through lines of effort, theater strategic objectives, and intermediate military objectives (IMOs) outlined in the Theater Strategy and Theater Campaign Plan. The TPP's role is to address the forces, footprint, and agreements needed to support these objectives.

2. ~~(S)~~ USAFRICOM's purpose is to protect America, Americans, and American interests, and create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development. (b)(1)1.4a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C.§130e

(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C.§130e

[REDACTED]

4. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

5. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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6. ~~(U)~~ Expanded access will require more assured access agreements; majority of existing agreements allow for training and exercises with caveats for other activities. These types of agreements are not responsive enough during a crisis as negotiation between the country team and host nation will need to take place.

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7. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

8. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

9. ~~(U)~~ Appendix 1 of the TPP lists the enduring locations in USAFRICOM's area of responsibility. There are currently two forward operating sites and seven cooperative security locations. This appendix describes the missions being supported and the capabilities of each location.

10. ~~(U)~~ This year's TPP updates associated posture initiatives at Camp Lemonnier; there are (b)(1)1.4a
to improve the overall operational capability supporting USAFRICOM, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Transportation Command.

11. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

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~~(U)~~ Section I, Overview

1. ~~(U)~~ Strategic Perspective. The United States (U.S.) Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Theater Posture Plan (TPP) is an integral part of the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and supports the Theater Strategy. USAFRICOM's mission requires access to forces (assigned, allocated, and aligned); access to partner nations' air, land, and maritime domains; and access to host nation infrastructure, both in the African and European theaters to support the execution of theater security cooperation activities, ongoing named operations, exercises and crisis response operations. With current fiscal realities and changing Department of Defense (DOD) priorities, reliance on key partner nation capabilities is a must but will prove to be a challenge in developing nations.

a. ~~(U)~~ General.

(1) ~~(U)~~ Overview. USAFRICOM must focus on the most threatening and complex challenges, while accepting risk in areas of relative stability. In this regard, USAFRICOM is guided by the following principles: A safe, secure, and stable Africa is in the national interest of the United States, and Africans are best able to address African security challenges in the long-run.

(2) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's purpose is twofold: 1) to protect the U.S. homeland, American citizens abroad and our national interests from transnational threats emanating from Africa; and 2) through sustained engagement, to enable our African partners to create a security environment that promotes stability, improved governance, and continued development. Should preventive or enabling efforts fail, we must always be prepared to prevail against any individual or organization that poses a threat to the United States, our interests or our allies and partners.

(a) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM must posture ourselves to prevail in our current and future operations against violent extremist organizations (VEOs), prepare to respond to future crises, and support other combatant commanders where threats jeopardize U.S. national interests across command boundaries. Finally, we must prevent future conflicts by building the capacity of our willing and capable partners to enable them to address security concerns and increase stability on the continent.

(b) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(3) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(4) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ Figure 1 displays how the TCP links the commander's priorities to the Guidance of Employment of the Force (GEF) end states through lines of effort (LOEs), theater strategic objectives (TSOs), and intermediate military objectives (IMOs). (b)(1)1.7e

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b. ~~(U)~~ Prioritized Theater Strategic Endstates. The USAFRICOM Theater Strategy and Campaign Plan are focused on achieving the Theater Strategic End States mandated in the 2010 GEF. These provide direction, justification, and purpose for the command's activities. They are:

(1) ~~(U)~~ End State 1: The al-Qaeda Networks (AQN)¹ and AQN-associated VEOs² in Africa do not have the intent or capability to strike the U.S. or U.S. interests abroad. The capacity of AQN and AQN-associated VEOs to strike the U.S. or U.S. interests is outweighed by the capacity of local governments to counter and defeat them.

(2) ~~(U)~~ End State 2: The U.S. maintains assured access and freedom of movement throughout the AOR.

(3) ~~(U)~~ End State 3: African states and regional organizations possess the will, capability, and capacity to combat transnational threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, narcotics, and other illicit trafficking.

(4) ~~(U)~~ End State 4: African states and regional organizations can execute effective continental peace operations and possess the capacity to respond to crises.

(5) ~~(U)~~ End State 5: African militaries operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states.

c. ~~(U)~~ Strategic Environment

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Africa's strategic environment will continue to be challenged by a wide array of issues resulting from poor governance, instability, and underdevelopment. Armed conflict, civilian displacement, atrocities, natural disasters, famine, piracy, and terrorist attacks are highly visible, and frequently prompt calls for an international response. Other challenges such as migration, illicit trafficking, climate change, and disease transmission are less visible, but have a significant impact on the strategic environment.

¹ ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

² ~~(U)~~ AQN-associated VEOs in the USAFRICOM AOR include, but are not limited to, al Shabaab (AS).

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(U) For more information regarding the strategic environment (country and region specific), see Annex B of the TCP.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Geographical and Cultural Context. The challenges above must be understood in the context of Africa's vast size, the diversity of its peoples, the fragility of its environment, and the multiplicity of its states. The African continent and the island states are more than three times the size of the continental U.S., with some states, such as Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), larger than most of Western Europe. There are 54 sovereign nations with over 1,000 languages spoken. Population is often affiliated by tribal clans vice geographical borders.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Political Context. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The political landscape in Africa will continue to change as it has over the past few decades as relationships between the U.S. Government (USG) and African nations mature along with development of regional bodies. Those relationships are fragile and are often affected by the political climate with regard to crises. Access to facilities to conduct operations may or may not be granted by African nations if not seen in their own best interest. There are several recent examples of how the political environment can affect access and ultimately operations.

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Although USG had some limited access to North Africa previously, beddown of forces during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN was not approved with the exception of performing humanitarian airlift missions only.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Following Kenya's recent incursion into Somalia, there was a perceived lack of USG support by the Government of Kenya; public statements were made denying access but were later rescinded.

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Although current access agreement with Djibouti provides for access, status protections and tax exemption, the levying of a fuel tax on the USG by the Government of Djibouti required alternate fuel and supply chains be established until a whole of government political resolution could be achieved.

(d) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Political and economic influences also impact access. Although USG has been episodically conducting engagements in Manda Bay since 2004, recent international agreements with China, South Sudan, and Uganda to build a major sea port in the vicinity of Manda Bay connecting pipelines from oil fields in Uganda, South Sudan and now Kenya may impact USG activities in the near future.

2. ~~(U)~~ Status of Efforts to Develop/Execute the TPP.

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a. ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's TPP supports the command's Theater Strategy and TCP by focusing efforts to develop access to appropriate transportation and logistics infrastructure that enables the execution of operations, exercises, and engagements but has the capability to support potential surge or crisis response operations while maintaining a small footprint. This multi-use approach to posture development is necessary to effectively use the limited resources, including Department of State (DOS) diplomatic capacity to negotiate and conclude agreements within the AOR that will be available to the command for the purposes of posture development. Posture development, where feasible and suitable, leverages existing agreements or relies on realistic modifications to those agreements.

(1) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's strategic approach is to protect American interests through execution of operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities. The command will strengthen the defense capabilities of African nations (individually and collectively) in ways that are consistent with the rule of law and respect for human rights. This approach will minimize the need to deploy U.S. forces and resources in Africa to protect U.S. vital interests.

(2) ~~(U)~~ The command must build enduring military-to-military relationships with our willing and capable partners on the continent to ensure U.S. access to the continent and the global commons. USAFRICOM's forward operating sites (FOSs)³, cooperative security locations (CSLs)⁴, and contingency locations (CLs)⁵ exist to support current operations and enable U.S. response to future taskings.

³(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

⁴(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

⁵ a non-enduring location that supports and sustains operations during named or unnamed contingencies or other operations as directed by appropriate authority and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements as Initial, Temporary, or Semi-Permanent.

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~~(U)~~ The recently released "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012" directs the development of innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives. The command's establishment of a network of non-enduring CLs meets that intent. These locations will normally be funded by the operation supported and Service components will be tasked to provide logistics support by the applicable operations order.

b. ~~(U)~~ Adequacy of Posture.

(1) ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

[REDACTED]

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM will continue to work with the Services for access to forces (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

[REDACTED]

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

(b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

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(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Footprint. Footprint is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as the amount of personnel, spares, resources, and capabilities physically present and occupying space at a deployed location. USAFRICOM is directed in the GEF to balance support for theater security cooperation, ongoing operations, and preparing for contingency response while maintaining a discreet force presence and facilities footprint; this has been reiterated in the recently released "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012" where the command will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives.

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The fiscal realities that face not only the U.S. but the command's allies and partners, will challenge future development of facilities on the continent. It is unlikely the future political and strategic environment in Africa will make stationing forces there feasible or acceptable. The command's posture strategy is threat based and lies within a vast band stretching from the Horn of Africa (HOA), across Sudan through the Trans Sahel region, then reaching down to the Gulf of Guinea (see figure 2). Therefore, the command's immediate 'footprint' focus shall remain on:

1. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Developing a strategic network of enduring FOSs and CSLs that provides the necessary access, freedom of movement, and logistical support to execute the command's theater campaign plan through its subordinate regional campaign plans and contingency plans throughout the continent of Africa. This network of FOSs and CSLs should capitalize on existing commercial capability and be appropriately scaled to support rotational forces and their missions assigned to Combined Joint Task Force-HOA (CJTF-HOA) and other task forces activated by USAFRICOM or other DOD components operating on the continent.

2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Establish non-enduring CLs as necessary to support operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities. A network of CLs provides access when needed without maintaining a fulltime presence on the continent. It supports USG policy as a low cost option by leveraging host nation (HN) services through contracts and acquisition cross servicing agreements (ACSAs). Some of these locations may develop into enduring locations in the future.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



3. ~~(U)~~ Critical to the command is access to key international airfields and seaports as well as U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to serve as capable support locations with existing and potential lines of communication. Leveraging HN infrastructure and Seabasing capabilities will preclude the need for costly U.S. facilities. However, some U.S. funded infrastructure improvements may be required when beyond the HN's capability or resources.

~~(U)~~ A crucial challenge at these facilities is an adequate fuel supply to support USAFRICOM, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM missions. Lead times to coordinate for sufficient quantity and quality of fuel could hamper operations. Presidential support missions in the past have proven to be challenging for HNs due to the amount of fuel consumed.

4. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The command is accepting some risk by not recommending establishment of enduring locations in North Africa and only

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having one enduring location in the south. Due to the close proximity to southern European bases, most logistical support for North Africa can be achieved without the need (or cost) to establish CSLs in the north. Gaborone, Botswana, is centrally located in the south and can support the region using hub-and-spoke operations; although a crisis would generate a demand for access to additional locations, the likelihood of such an event is low.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Agreements. In many cases, the necessary agreements do not exist in order to operationalize this network of FOSs and CSLs. Within the context of theater posture, assured access may be best described as: possessing a high degree of confidence that at a moment of crisis or need, the HN will grant sufficient access to a region/facilities in order to execute required actions; as established through binding international access agreements, established relationships, or an overall level of commitment built upon mutual interest, or overlapping and perhaps access redundant with other partners.

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The command will continue to work in close coordination with Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), DOS, and U.S. Country Teams in Africa to acquire the necessary access agreements with our Africa partners. Despite binding arrangements in place, the HN may limit U.S. access based on a number of factors, including a lack of government and/or popular support for U.S. participation in a crisis. As evident during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN in Libya, multiple nations denied the U.S. access to conduct operations. Consequently, access needs to be strengthened at existing locations and redundancy developed at others to ensure access in order to facilitate operational success.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ ACSAs provide for logistical support and servicing but can include use of host nation facilities. ACSAs support the command's posture strategy and meet the intent of the Department's direction to develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives.

~~(U)~~ For more detailed information on ACSAs, see Annex D in the TCP.

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Since 2008, the Commander, USAFRICOM, had to approve 97 waivers due to inadequate status protection agreements in countries the command has tasked personnel to deploy to in order to accomplish missions. Of the 53 countries in the AOR, 22 countries have no status protection agreements, 5 with Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), and the remaining 26 have adequate protections through exchange of Diplomatic Notes. USAFRICOM assessed existing status protection agreements in countries with planned engagements; a list of 12 prioritized countries was developed and submitted to JS/J5 and OSD for State Department assistance.

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Calendar Year 2012 command priorities for SOFAs can be found in Appendix 3
– Host Nation Agreement by Country.

c. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(1) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(a) ~~(U)~~ The command's number one posture requirement is Camp
Lemonnier, Djibouti. (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(b) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

⁶ Service Lead Agent will be used to describe the lead Service component's responsibilities with regard to lead agency, host Service, lead component, combatant command infrastructure support agent (CISA), base operations support (BOS), or logistics-integrator (Log-I).

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~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(c) ~~(//FOUO)~~ The command anticipates an increase in allocated SOF and ISR assets and will need to expand access to support them in order to counter violent extremism in the North-West and Central regions. By strategically placing assets closer to collection areas, greater loiter time is achieved and can be supported with fewer aircraft, thus reducing the footprint and the overall presence in the theater. The command's vision is to utilize host nation facilities and contract support through airport services or other commercial avenues. Ideally, access to host nation military fields could potentially further reduce the U.S presence as there would be a basic level of security that would already be provided that would only need to be augmented.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Efforts to secure access to, and overflight of, airspace must be prioritized.

d. ~~(U)~~ Key decisions and associated milestones

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

e. ~~(U)~~ Status of HN Relationships. Access to airspace and host nation facilities is often dependent on relationships; not just relationships between USG and host nation, but host nation relationships with neighboring countries and African organizations. Status of current agreements with a prioritized list of countries to engage can be found in Appendix 3.

f. ~~(U)~~ Outreach Efforts.

(1) ~~(U)~~ Interagency, other Commands, and African Partners.

(a) ~~(U)~~ In order to fully support the TCP and regional campaign plans, USAFRICOM will need to engage with DOS Bureau of African Affairs and Bureau of Near East Affairs, U.S. Embassy Country Teams, and Partner Nations (PN) to create conditions to improve DOD posture on the Continent of

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
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Africa to support directed operations and enabling support such as ISR and logistics.


(b) ~~(U)~~ Outreach to Other Combatant Commands. This TPP complements the DOD's GDP strategy by positioning key capabilities to enable a rapid and flexible response for the execution of a broad spectrum of operations (from theater security cooperation to combat operations). It accounts for capabilities required by other DOD agencies such as Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to support functional combatant commands such as USTRANSCOM, as identified in its En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) and USSOCOM, and requirements of other geographic combatant commands to support their operations along AOR seams. This will be accomplished by identifying their requirements during staffing to ensure this plan is synchronized with their respective plans.

g. ~~(U)~~ Resourcing/Execution Implications and Issues.

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C.§130e

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(a) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(b) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(2) ~~(U)~~ The upcoming transition from overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding to base funding will have a significant impact. Resolution of Service Lead Agent issues for USAFRICOM's CSLs is a must. This assignment is essential for future development of the command's posture locations.

(3) ~~(U)~~ Many of the command's priorities regarding MILCON projects often fail to compete with Service priorities. The command will continue to generate Issue Papers in OSD's Program/Budget Review process to advocate and compete for limited resources.

h. ~~(U)~~ Overview of Key Posture Change Proposals. This year, there are no changes to enduring locations in the TPP; however, posture initiatives at Camp Lemonnier have changed and are annotated in Appendix 2.

3. ~~(U)~~ Unresolved Policy Issues.

~~(U)~~ Service ownership issues continue to be a source of frustration. Funding must be programmed in order for the command to achieve its objectives; the command is forced to compete for Service funding through the Program Budget Review process.

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~~(U)~~ Section II, Current Posture

1. ~~(U)~~ Criteria Used for Selection of Locations.

a. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(1) ~~(U)~~ Proximity—Additional Detail. When considering the proximity of each location to key areas/regions, each location was assessed for its ability to fulfill one or more of the following functions:

(a) ~~(U)~~ Supports operations in the regional plans supporting the Global Campaign Plan for Counterterrorism (GCP-CT).

(b) ~~(U)~~ Supports most likely contingency/crisis response areas to include but not limited to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR), noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), Foreign Consequence Management, Pandemic Influenza and Infectious Disease.

(c) ~~(U)~~ Supports other sub-regional engagement activities.

1. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Supports operations in and around a JSCP-directed planning priority.

3. ~~(U)~~ Supports a key hub for the AU's African Standby Force.

4. ~~(U)~~ Collocated with other USG and/or international partners.

(d) ~~(U)~~ Supports other combatant command needs to include USEUCOM and USCENTCOM operational requirements and USTRANSCOM Global Reach requirements.

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(2) ~~(U)~~ Infrastructure - Other Considerations. An important factor when selecting the theater posture locations is identifying locations, where possible, that have both a port facility capable of accepting a maritime prepositioning ship (MPS) and an airfield able to handle strategic or intra-theater airlift.

(3) ~~(U)~~ Logistics Considerations.

(a) ~~(U)~~ USAFRICOM's deployment and distribution is supported by three routes into Africa from the continental United States: northern, central, and southern (Figure 3). USTRANSCOM has identified two locations in the AOR as critical to support this global enroute system: Ascension Island (United Kingdom), a key refueling node providing strategic reach into the southern part of the AOR; and Camp Lemonnier (Djibouti), a multimodal logistics hub. USTRANSCOM has also indicated a need for access to Dakar, Senegal; Accra, Ghana; and Mombasa, Kenya to support USAFRICOM missions in and out of Africa. USTRANSCOM's requirements are identified/reviewed annually within the ERIMP and military construction solutions are prioritized within the Global En Route Steering Committee conference.

(b) ~~(U)~~ The future of USAFRICOM logistics is linked to the success of the Adaptive Logistics Network (ALN) concept. USAFRICOM uses this concept to enhance the existing African logistics capabilities to help African nations build enduring capacity and capability. This is done through cooperation and coordination with the DOD, USG Organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IOs, international commercial firms and other entities with common objectives. This cooperation and coordination will create synergy to achieve the USAFRICOM mission.

(c) ~~(U)~~ For more detailed information on logistics, see Annex D in the TCP.

(4) ~~(U)~~ Mission Assurance. Legal protections, force protection, medical capability of HN to support US personnel, criminal element, geo-political issues, as well as other critical elements that could jeopardize mission success need to be considered.

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



2. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Theater Posture (FOS-CSL) Locations in the USAFRICOM AOR. Current posture consists of two FOSs and seven CSLs; expanded information can be found in Appendix 1. Locations are listed alphabetically by country. Each location must go through four lines of effort within the DOD posture management model⁷ (strategy development, diplomacy, implementation, and

⁷ ~~(U)~~ Strategy Development: Review posture proposals and existing plans against emerging access risks and opportunities, determines posture needs and assesses options for refining plans, prioritizes needs and integrates them with the broader posture strategy and plans, staffs new proposals inside the command and DOD, and seeks senior leader guidance or decisions.

~~(U)~~ Diplomacy: Efforts include posture-related outreach and planning with other USG departments or agencies (particularly with Department of State) and Congress (as required); the development of associated diplomatic strategies, guidance and plans; and host-nation consultations and negotiations.

~~(U)~~ Implementation: Providing guidance – including priorities – for posture investments; resourcing and executing posture changes; synchronizing posture changes with global force management and related DOD efforts; and assessing the implementation of changes.

~~(U)~~ Sustainment: Sustainment focuses on maintaining host-nation access relationships to ensure that posture initiatives endure as long as required.

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sustainment; lines of effort can be overlapping—see Figure 4). Each posture initiative generally follows a sequential path from one line of effort to the next, but it is possible that any particular initiative could involve activities in all four lines of effort at one time. FOS/CSL posture issues will tend to “recycle” in this construct. Each location is evaluated annually to ensure each supports USAFRICOM’s strategy. The HN relationships (with regard to access agreements) are listed in Appendix 3 for all 53 African countries in USAFRICOM’s AOR. Within the description of each location below, a component is designated as lead component which will involve lead agency, host Service, Service Lead Agent, CISA, BOS, or Log-I responsibilities.




Figure 4. DOD posture management model (U)

a. (S//REL USA, ACGU) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Ascension Island, United Kingdom. This location is designated a FOS that supports USTRANSCOM's global lift requirements and USSTRATCOM's space mission support. Although there are weekly flights into Ascension, USTRANSCOM acknowledges in their ERIMP, the runway and fuel storage is inadequate. AFAFRICA is designated lead component for Ascension Island, UK. This location is in the Sustainment phase.

c. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

e. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

f. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

g. ~~(S//REL USA, ACQU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

h. ~~(S//REL USA, ACQU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

i. ~~(S//REL USA, ACQU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d






Figure 5. USAFRICOM Theater Posture Locations ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~

3. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e



a. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e



(1) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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(2) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(3) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(U)~~ Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAF established 17th Air Force in 2008 as the Air Force component assigned to USAFRICOM; however, in 3rd quarter FY12, 17th Air Force was deactivated and consolidated with Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) staff, whereas the commander is the dual-hatted component commander to both USAFRICOM and USEUCOM.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Allocation of forces will be through the GFM and Request For Forces (RFF) processes. AFAFRICA will continue to serve as lead component for U.S. Air Force (USAF) designated posture locations in Africa.

c. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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USARAF/SETAF will serve as lead component for U.S. Army designated posture locations in Africa.

e. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C.§130c

(1) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(2) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

f. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(a) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

g. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130c

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

h. ~~(C//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130c

i. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

j. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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k. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

l. ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

a. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Increasing the number of offices of security cooperation (OSCs) within the USAFRICOM AOR. The command's continuing effort to expand security cooperation programs in the AOR requires more robust military representation in U.S. embassies throughout the continent. OSC personnel must be present to collaborate with DOS and other USG partners to ensure: 1) program planning is in support of Ambassadors' Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (MSRPs) and; 2) sufficient capability is in place to coordinate and execute these programs in support of the country teams and the command's strategy and campaign plan.

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM determines where these offices should be placed based on the following criteria:

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM theater strategic objectives and associated critical partners,

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Level of TSC Programs (Title 10 and 22),

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Complexity of Program Execution (the country's level of experience with DOD programs,

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(d) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Level of other USG agency activity, including activities that involve military capacity building, such as security sector reform (SSR), and,

(e) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Size of Country Team / Senior Defense Official (SDO)—capacity to execute TSC programs on behalf of USAFRICOM or Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The ability of USAFRICOM to fill OSC billets rests on services' ability to fill approved OSC billets. Some countries may be a higher priority than others but may go gapped based on which service is responsible for filling the authorization.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM is planning to continue this expansion of OSCs in FY13-14 by adding 4 new offices. They are Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Madagascar.

(c) In addition, the command desires to establish one LNO to the Southern Africa Development Community (PD is in place).

(3) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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b. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

e. ~~(U)~~ Prepositioned Material. There are several factors that influence the USAFRICOM Prepositioning Strategy.

(1) ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ A second factor is the limited transportation network (road and rail) on the continent to support movement of prepositioned material from country to country. Political factors and diplomatic clearances may also impede the ability to move materials from one country to another. It is anticipated that strategic and intratheater airlift will be required to transport forces and equipment directly to required locations.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Many of the sea ports have draft and berthing limitations preventing MPSs from coming pier side. The command supports increased utilization of the high speed vessel (HSV) program, which is a key connector in the sea basing concept. It bridges the gap between high speed air lift and low speed sea lift. HSVs enable rapid closure of forces from staging areas, logistics movement from MPSs to amphibious ships, and movement of forces to low-draft ports. It embarks up to company-sized units including personnel, equipment, and supplies. It supports combat operations, irregular warfare, theater security cooperation, FHA/DR, NEO, and special operations forces as an afloat staging base.

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(4) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ USAFRICOM seeks to partner with DLA and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs to support ongoing missions and contingencies. Many of these organizations preposition material in Europe as well as on the continent; the command will assist movement and distribution of these supplies when tasked. USAFRICOM will continue to leverage continent based capabilities by contracting support and equipment requirements to the maximum extent; ready access to contracting support unit capabilities is a necessity.

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~~(U)~~ Section III - Posture Change Proposals.

1. ~~(U)~~ Combatant Commander's Posture Plan Assessment.

a. ~~(U)~~ This TPP is supportable logistically and enables USAFRICOM to conduct operations, exercises, and security cooperation activities; it is also consistent with current Secretary of Defense guidance. Despite the constraints of the strategic environment (transportation, infrastructure, and communications capabilities), these risks are mitigated by the planned use of existing commercial facilities with adequate infrastructure to meet initial response actions. As USAFRICOM works with sovereign African states, this plan enables USAFRICOM to sustain its engagement with those partner states that are best able to advance security within Africa. The Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, April 2012, further addresses the political-military, operational risk, force structure (where applicable), and infrastructure/resource implications of posture changes.

b. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

~~(U)~~ USTRANSCOM has identified Libreville, Gabon as a primary en route airfield for Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa, which is not a USAFRICOM enduring location. Based on the command's strategy, coupled with a low demand signal, development of Libreville as a future CSL is not recommended at this time. This course of action does not prevent USTRANSCOM from utilizing Libreville as a primary en route location.


d. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ The command will continue to work with OSD and DOS to establish assured access agreements and status protections, especially as it develops plans to gain expanded access to achieve strategic objectives.

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2. ~~(U)~~ Proposed Posture Changes. Details on locations are contained in APPENDIX 2.

~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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Appendixes

- 1 - ~~(U)~~ Current Theater Posture Locations Matrix ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~
- 2 - ~~(U)~~ Theater Posture Change Proposal Summaries (S)
- 3 - ~~(U)~~ Host Nation Agreements by Country ~~(S)~~
- 4 - ~~(U)~~ Tasks to the Command Staff and Subordinate Commands ~~(S//REL USA, ACGU)~~

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~~(U)~~ APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 CURRENT THEATER POSTURE LOCATIONS, USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

1. ~~(U)~~ Purpose. These enclosures describe the mission support and infrastructure capabilities needed at USAFRICOM's enduring locations to support U.S. forces access to the continent, crisis response, and the conduct of partner security force (PSF) training. These engagements generally occur in countries that do not have adequate host nation (HN) support facilities or the capability of providing the level of support required in the TPP.
 2. ~~(U)~~ Intent. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) made several recommendations to "Rebalance the Force" and "Strengthen Relationships." USAFRICOM has incorporated efforts to "Build the Security Capacity of Partner States" and "Strengthening Key Relations Abroad" as part of its strategy and planning approach to advance these QDR recommendations. Most notably, there is a need to sustain and expand these engagements in all African regions enabling those nations to develop capable and loyal security forces that can provide African solutions to African security challenges.
 3. ~~(U)~~ Current. In many countries, HNs lack adequate support facilities for U.S. forces. The specific details of each enduring location are outlined in enclosures 1-9; Enclosures 1 and 2 contain details for the current AFRICOM FOSs, and enclosures 3-9 contain details of the current CSLs. Current information on force protection (FP) can be found on the Joint Risk Assessment Management Program (JRAMP) website (<http://jramp.smil.mil>); current airfield and sea port surveys can be found on USTRANSCOM's website (<https://transcom.jioc.dodis.smil.mil/transcom/>).
- Enclosure 1 – Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 2 – Ascension Island, United Kingdom ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 3 – Gaborone, Botswana ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 4 – Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 5 – Douala, Cameroon ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 6 – Kotoka Airfield, Accra, Ghana ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 7 – Mombasa, Kenya ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 8 – Dakar, Senegal ~~(S)~~
Enclosure 9 – Entebbe, Uganda ~~(S)~~

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 1, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (NAVAF).

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ Description of the location:

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

c. ~~(U)~~ Expands to support reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of a brigade-equivalent ground element, a Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), and Air Mobility enablers during contingency operations.

d. ~~(U)~~ Serves as a major aerial port of debarkation (APOD) and as a major regional heavy lift logistic hub for USTRANSCOM supporting global and regional operations as depicted in the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP).

~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

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e. ~~(U)~~ Serves as a major regional command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) hub.

f. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

i. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(U)~~ CLDJ is of particular importance to the Department as an enduring location and key strategic hub in the region that supports regional and global operations. Djibouti is the vital link between U.S. security concerns on the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa and is positioned along a key strategic choke point. CLDJ provides crucial access to USAFRICOM and also supports the operations of USCENTCOM, USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, DIA, and other U.S. agencies. CLDJ is the only FOS within 1,000 miles with the capability to sustain the mission supporting these operations. CLDJ will grow in importance to USPACOM as it increases engagements with India to counter Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Continued improvements to CLDJ, including military construction (MILCON) projects, will remain essential to support the increasing demand being placed on the FOS by the four combatant commands and other agencies.

c. ~~(U)~~ The commander recognizes that CLDJ is currently at surge capacity; USAFRICOM's 2020 vision for CLDJ is to continue to be developed as the primary enduring location in the region supporting enduring mission sets with the ability to surge for crisis operations and contingencies. Informed by the East Africa

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Campaign Plan, the commander sees Department of Defense's (DOD) contributions to both CT and counter-piracy decreasing as partner nations' capabilities increase and take on lead roles, similar to U.S. drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan. CLDJ must provide support functions (camp headquarters, base operating support, medical, force protection, etc.) and be able to accommodate a scalable JTF-like organization to command and control the command's operations and theater security cooperation in the region (currently CJTF-HOA), a special operations task force/command element, and rotational deployed forces conducting personnel recovery, maritime security, strike, and ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] missions and supporting security cooperation/security force assistance activities. The camp will continue to serve as a major regional heavy lift logistic hub in DOD's global transportation network and as a major aerial and seaport of debarkation supporting global and regional operations and logistics; the camp must provide RSOI capabilities. CLDJ will also continue to serve as a regional C4I hub.

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U)~~ Support to CJTF-HOA. CJTF-HOA is tasked by the EACP as the command and control structure for operations in the HOA CJOA and to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional stability, prevent conflict and protect U.S. and coalition interests. When directed by CDRUSAFRICOM, CJTF-HOA conducts operations or security cooperation activities outside the CJOA. CJTF-HOA is also required to provide Personnel Recovery (PR) and force protection (FP) for its assigned forces.

(2) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(3) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(4) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(5) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(6) ~~(U)~~ Provide for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSO&I) of all Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and humanitarian engagements throughout eastern and central Africa.

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(c) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(d) ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.7e

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U)~~ Steady state requirements will focus around enduring mission sets; does not include PA&E contractors. These steady state requirements include but are not limited to:

(a) ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b) ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(c) ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ [b](1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

3. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(2) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(a) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b) ~~(S)~~ Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

(c) ~~(S)~~ Support to NEO in East/South Africa region

(d) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(e) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

c. ~~C//RDT~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(b)(1)1.7e

5. ~~(S)~~ Future capability improvements.

a. ~~(U)~~ Prioritized MILCON projects to improve future capability are listed below; however, the commander recently directed all MILCON projects be reassessed with anticipated reductions in scope and costs.

(1) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(3) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(4) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(5) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(6) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(b)(1)1.7e

(7) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(1)1.7e

~~(C//RPP)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(8) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(9) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(10) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(11) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(12) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(13) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(14) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(1)1.4a

(15) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(16) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(17) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(18) ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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~~SECRET~~

(19) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

(20) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

(21) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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8. ~~(U)~~

(b)(1)1.7e

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ Future issues or milestones. None.

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ Recommended diplomatic actions. Camp Lemonnier is in the Sustainment phase.

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 2, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Ascension Island, United Kingdom (AFAFRICA)

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. AFAFRICA is designated component lead for Ascension Island, UK.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

[REDACTED]

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(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Limited capability with small single pier.

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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~~(S)~~ ENCLOSURE 3, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. AFAFRICA is designated the component lead for Gaborone, Botswana. In addition to the support described above, the location is capable of surge operations and supports the movement of military requirements.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

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a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Airfield Capability.

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Fuel reserves at Sir Seretse Khama International Airport are extremely limited, and even more so at the Thebephatshwa Air Base (TAB), though Puma Energy and the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) are interested in pursuing a cooperative agreement to help increase fuel storage capacities.

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

5. ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.7e

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6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 4, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY 13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. USARAF/SETAF is the designated component lead for Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

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- a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
 - b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
 - c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
 - d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.
6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None.
9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 5, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]
[redacted]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. Component lead has not been designated by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef); however, USAFRICOM recommends NAVAFA based on preponderance of missions. Cameroon is a focal point for partners' regional maritime operations with the establishment of the Zone D Agreement (ECCAS). It extends and formalizes Africa Partnership Station (APS) access further down the coast.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]
[redacted]

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [redacted]

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3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

b. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]

c. ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Port Capability. Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)/Large, Medium-Speed RORO [roll-on/roll-off] (LMSR) draft restrictions.

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED].

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 6, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. AFAFRICA is designated as the component lead for Accra, Ghana.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ C-5/C-17 suitable with working MOG of 1 C-17.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Est Fuel Availability (K gal/day). 158.

c. ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Berth Depth (ft)/Length (ft). 36/1889.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Staging Acres. 62.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Proximity (miles). 14.

(4) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 7, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support. NAVAFAF is designated as the component lead for Mombasa, Kenya.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ C-5/C-17 suitable with working MOG of 5 C-17s.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Est Fuel Availability (K gal/day). 412.

(3) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Berth Depth (ft)/Length (ft). 33.8/1968.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Staging Acres. 52.3.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Proximity (miles). 3.

(4) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e [REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. Kenyan Ministry of Defense has repeatedly stated its desire for a review of the current Facilities and Access Agreement, and are currently undergoing an internal review. USEMB currently requesting that Main State provide team to renegotiate the terms of the 1980 Facilities and Access Agreement.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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~~(S)~~ ENCLOSURE 8, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

2. ~~(S)~~ Mission Support. Component lead for Dakar, Senegal has not been designated by SecDef; USAFRICOM will make a recommendation in the FY14 TPP.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability. Availability of Riverine training areas, small arms and bombing ranges makes Dakar an ideal SOF location and potential Exercise Center of Excellence.

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~~SECRET~~

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Leopold Sedar Senghor Intl Airfield.

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ C-5/C-17 suitable with working MOG of 3 C-17s.

(b) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Est Fuel Availability (K gal/day). 114.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Thies Airfield.

(a) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Non-operational.

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(1) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Berth Depth (ft)/Length(ft). 38/1391.

(2) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Staging Acres. 43.7.

(3) ~~(U//FOUO)~~ Seaport Proximity (miles). 9.

(4) ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. Senegal desires the construction of a range and built to U.S. specifications to increase interoperability and training benefits for their own forces.

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a. ~~(U)~~ Thies Airfield.

- (1) ~~(U)~~ Construct Vehicle Convoy Live Fire Range to support WESTERN ACCORD 12. FY12 Military exercise construction requested \$281K (MARFORAF).
- (2) ~~(U)~~ Conduct Range improvements to support FLINTLOCK 12. FY12 Military exercise construction requested \$218K (SOCAFRICA).
- (3) ~~(U)~~ Construct Shootouse to support FLINTLOCK 12. FY12 Military exercise construction requested \$457K (SOCAFRICA).

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. None.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ ~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d~~

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~~(U)~~ ENCLOSURE 9, APPENDIX 1 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12
FY13 USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE PLAN (TPP)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ~~(U)~~ Mission Support: Entebbe is a key UN/NGO hub for humanitarian aid. USARAF/SETAF is designated component lead for Entebbe, Uganda.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

3. ~~(U)~~ Current Force Posture and Capability.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

b. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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c. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

d. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

4. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

5. ~~(U)~~ Future capability improvements. None.

6. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

7. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

8. ~~(U)~~ Status of any current HN consultations or negotiations. Global Text SOFA Dipnote delivered to Government of Uganda in May 2011. Currently awaiting Uganda concurrence to conclude the agreement. In addition, USAFRICOM is currently coordinating with USEMB Kampala for assured access with a Dipnote agreement.

9. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

10. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d [REDACTED]

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Figure 1: Current Posture:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d



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~~(U)~~ APPENDIX 2 ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN
7000-12
FY13 PROPOSED POSTURE CHANGES, USAFRICOM THEATER POSTURE
PLAN (TPP)

1. ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b



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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-1-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Deployed Billeting Phase 2, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~(b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY14; 1391 (as 21 Feb 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

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7. **Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization:** ~~(U)~~ Several alternatives have been evaluated ranging from continued use of tents and containerized living units (CLU) to unified facilities criteria standards (UFC). Tents are considered inappropriate berthing for personnel assigned to the camp for periods of a year or longer. Life cycle costs for CLUs are almost as much as UFC options when health, safety, and force protection considerations are accounted for.

8. **Agreements:** ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. **Project Detail:**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. **ELML Change Nominations:** ~~(U)~~ None.

11. **Additional Comments:** ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-2-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Task Force Phase 2, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

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
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6. **Timelines and/or Milestones:** ~~(U)~~ FY14; 1391 (as of 10 May 2012) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. **Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization:** ~~(U)~~ Task Force personnel continue to operate out of temporary, undersized and substandard facilities. The options include renovation or modernization, however, there are no available facilities in camp to renovate, or Lease options.

8. **Agreements:** ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e, (b)(3) 10 U.S.C. §130e



9. **Project Detail:**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. **ELML Change Nominations:** ~~(U)~~ None.

11. **Additional Comments:** ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-3-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Joint Mobility Processing Center, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Current facilities are inadequate to support throughput of passengers and meet U.S. Department of Homeland Security's transportation standards. Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the

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FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY14; 1391 (as of 13 Jan 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ Camp has limited alternatives for processing large volumes of personnel and cargo; existing facility is a temporary expeditionary substandard facility that does not meet health and safety codes, life safety conditions where personnel are subjected to high risk, and substandard ATPF construction guidelines for a mass gathering facility.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-4-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Amory, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Existing armories that are physically deficient, significantly undersized, and do not provide adequate electronic monitoring. Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY14; 1391 on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

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7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ No alternate facilities are adequately set up to meet the physical requirements of an armory. A new facility must be built to specifications to meet operational needs.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-5-A

1. Initiative Title: (U) Air Cargo Terminal, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: (U) Current facilities are inadequate to support throughput of cargo and meet U.S. Department of Homeland Security's transportation standards. Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: (U) None.

5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding

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transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.


6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY15; 1391 on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ Camp has limited alternatives for processing large volumes of cargo; existing capability does not exist. Presently, air cargo is left in the open environment with minimal protection.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e



9. Project Detail:



10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-6-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Wastewater Plant, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ The total treatment capacity for both plants is 360,000 gallons per day (gpd). This is insufficient to support the projected steady state population of 2,100 people with the capability to support a camp population of up to 4,400 which includes host nation contractors supporting the camp. In January 2010, the camp reached a population of 3,300 and as of April 2010 it had not gone below 3,200 persons. When staff turnovers occur such as Relief in Place - Transfer of Authority events, the camp must institute water restrictions such as mandating combat showers and securing the self service laundry facilities. These are in addition to regularly using paper plates in the galley and discharging wastewater from the central laundry facility directly into a ditch.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

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5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: (U) FY15; 1391 (as of 01 Feb 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: (U) Renovation/modernization is not a viable alternative. The existing plant can be expanded by another 80,000 gallons but that, in combination with the package plant, will not meet the projected requirement. Lease is also not an option as there is no host nation utility providers that could be leveraged.

8. Agreements: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: (U) None.

11. Additional Comments: (U) None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-7-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Medical/Dental Facility, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ With planned closure of the French hospital, a gap in medical capability will occur. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs. The existing Expeditionary Medical Facility (EMF) is only outfitted to support an expeditionary mission and is inadequate for a more established presence in Djibouti. In addition, as AFRICOM's mission increases and becomes more complex, the need for appropriate medical capabilities becomes paramount. The EMF's current capabilities include 10 beds (3 intensive care and 7 intermediate wards), surgical capabilities (2 operating rooms), primary care, limited ancillary capabilities (laboratory, radiology, pharmacy) and dental care. The medical staff is currently located in Building 130, an expeditionary structure, and uses a portion of Building 200 as an ambulance bay. The facilities are supplemented with CONEX boxes and tents for activities and storage that cannot fit into either building. Neither facility meets AT/FP criteria, National Electrical Code (NEC) or International Electrotechnical Code (IEC) standards or fire protection requirements. A recent repair project to replace the roof on Building 130 was canceled due to concerns that the structure could not support the new roof. The structure's inability to support additional weight also prevents the installation of a fire sprinkler system.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY15; 1391 (as of 4 Feb 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ With planned closure of French hospital, only alternative to building capability would be to keep expeditionary medical care in place and rely in medical evacuation for needed emergency medical care subjecting personnel to risk. Renovation is not an option. The existing facility is vastly undersized for the current mission. Constructing an addition to the existing expeditionary building is impractical and would not meet force protection criteria.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e
[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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10. ELML Change Nominations: (U) None.

11. Additional Comments: (U) None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-8-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Entry Control Point, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Currently there is only one access point located at the westernmost side of the camp. All vehicles must pass through this one gate and it can become a bottleneck at times. There is a large amount of construction taking place on the camp and much of the congestion at the gate is due to construction vehicles. These vehicles are of particular concern to security so they must be thoroughly screened before entering and therefore take more time to process.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

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5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: (U) FY15; 1391 (as of 01 Feb 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: (U) To alleviate congestion and security risks, the only option is to establish a second ECP.

8. Agreements: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: (U) None.

11. Additional Comments: (U) None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-9-A

1. Initiative Title: (U) Electrical Generation, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: (U) The camp is currently operating six MUSE generators and eight Caterpillar generators to provide shore power. The MUSE program provides portable utility equipment modules for short term support to shore facility systems for contingency or emergency operations. The program is not intended to provide permanent shore utility services or to augment or substitute for existing systems on a permanent basis. The total deployment period is not supposed to exceed 72 months. Extensions which result in a total deployment period in excess of 72 months require approval from the CNO. The generators were installed in 2007 and have well exceeded the 72 month limit. Due to the growth of the camp, the power demand and energy consumption has not been reduced sufficiently to support the removal of the generators. In fact the power demand has only increased. As of July 28, 2010, there was a 34 percent increase in energy consumption as compared to the same four-month period the previous year. When taking into account the need to have one generator down for maintenance, one in spinning reserve and the reduced efficiencies for environmental conditions, the MUSE generators are still critical to the operation of the camp's power plant.

B. Military Risk: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY16; 1391 (as of 18 Jan 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ Due to unreliable commercial capabilities, only alternative would be to continue with current generators and risk failure. There are no generators available to modernize; all of the generators at the camp are already in use. Leasing generators for an enduring requirement is cost prohibitive.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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~~SECRET~~

Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-10-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Deployed Billeting Phase III, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Currently there are over 3,300 persons assigned to Camp Lemonier with the projected number of military and civilians to reach 3,700. Most are housed in Containerized Living Units (CLU) with the remainder living in tents. The CLUs are 8' x 40' cargo containers that are divided into two 8' x 20' halves. Each half accommodates one or two people depending upon rank. Of the 1,200 units only 300 have heads, the remaining personnel use common latrines as do personnel residing in the tents. All the units are air conditioned with individual units which run constantly in the East African desert.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY16; 1391 (as of 2 Feb 2011) on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ Several alternatives have been evaluated ranging from continued use of tents and containerized living units (CLU) to unified facilities criteria standards (UFC). Tents are considered inappropriate berthing for personnel assigned to the camp for periods of a year or longer. Life cycle costs for CLUs are almost as much as UFC options when health, safety, and force protection considerations are accounted for.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~(b)(1)1.7e
[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:
[REDACTED]

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-11-A

1. Initiative Title: (U) Central Laundry/Billeting Office, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: (U) Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: (U) None.

5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

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6. **Timelines and/or Milestones:** ~~(U)~~ FY16; 1391 on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. **Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization:** ~~(U)~~ Several alternatives have been evaluated ranging from permanent to continue operating in substandard temporary structures.

8. **Agreements:** ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e



9. **Project Detail:**



10. **ELML Change Nominations:** ~~(U)~~ None.

11. **Additional Comments:** ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-12-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ JOC/HQ Phase 2, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs. CLDJ is a key hub to supporting full spectrum operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA). As the only forward operating site in Africa, CLDJ provides critical support for U.S. military operations including USSOCOM, USTRANSCOM, USAFRICOM and several other executive agencies. Currently there is no adequate existing infrastructure for the CJTF command and control function, or for the CLDJ HQ function at this location. A fully connected, secure and operable facility is needed to provide mission planning, training, execution to support special operations and to give the commander operational flexibility to counter emerging threats and support ongoing operations. The Joint HQ and JOC facility will enable the CJTF to exercise command and control of operations to better support objectives set forth by Commander, CJTF-HOA and USAFRICOM. It will also provide vital C2 integration for planning and execution of missions supporting USTRANSCOM, USAFRICOM, and USSOCOM, and other U.S. government agencies in and around east Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

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3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: (U) None.

5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY17; 1391 on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: (U) There are no suitable facilities available to renovate to meet the requirement for a joint operations center or the headquarters staff. Leasing is not an option since there are no facilities available to lease.

8. Agreements: (U)(b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-13-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Multi-Purpose Facility, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ The existing movie theater is one seventh the size required for the current camp population. Its small size prevents it from showing 35mm films so it is restricted to using DVDs. Also because of the size, many people miss the opportunity to see films they would like simply because there isn't enough room. For particularly popular films, MWR will repeat shows at the All Hands Clubs however this is less than ideal. The Club caters to personnel playing table games, pool, ping pong and personnel just generally socializing so it can be hard to hear the movie. Additionally the video equipment used must be portable in nature resulting in poor picture quality. The existing movie theater also doubles as an auditorium. Conference room space in camp is very limited. Large department meetings are sometimes held in the theater because it is one of the few, large air conditioned spaces on camp. Regularly scheduled indoctrination briefs are held in the theater as well. All hands briefs that are quite large must be held at the All Hands Club. This requires moving furniture out of the Club and bringing portable chairs in. Neither the movie theater nor the All Hands Club is conducive to testing so tests are often administered at the air passenger terminal lounge. This can be a problem when there are a large number of passengers transiting through the facility. The terminal is already too small to support its intended purpose. The situation is worsened when the combination of high volume and test taking occur at the same time.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]


3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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4. Force Structure and Management: (U) None.

5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: (U) FY17; 1391 on file. Design will begin when Congress approves project.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: (U) The camp does not have a facility available to renovate or lease.

8. Agreements: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

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9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

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10. ELML Change Nominations: (U) None.

11. Additional Comments: (U) None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-14-A

1. Initiative Title: (U) Engineer Equipment Area, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: (U) Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: (S) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: (U) None.

5. Resource Implications: (U) U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: (U) FY17; no 1391 developed for this project yet.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: (U) No current facility exists that can house the Construction Battalion Maintenance personnel work area.

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8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-15-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Pop-up Barriers for Taxiway, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Current capability does not exist; camp utilizes mounted security patrols to mitigate risk as an interim measure.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

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6. **Timelines and/or Milestones:** (U) FY17; no 1391 developed for this project yet.

7. **Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization:** (U) Vehicle barriers are the best and most economical solution to providing security at an ECP.

8. **Agreements:** (U) (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. **Project Detail:**

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. **ELML Change Nominations:** (U) None.

11. **Additional Comments:** (U) None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-16-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Boat Maintenance Shop, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs. A facility is required for maintenance personnel.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the

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FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY17; no 1391 developed for this project yet.

7. Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization: ~~(U)~~ No other facilities are available for boat maintenance personnel than the temporary containerized units. A new facility is the best option.

8. Agreements: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

9. Project Detail:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. ELML Change Nominations: ~~(U)~~ None.

11. Additional Comments: ~~(U)~~ None.

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Initiative Summary Sheet
U.S. Africa Command

Issue ID#: USAFRICOM-FY13-17-A

1. Initiative Title: ~~(U)~~ Deployed Billeting Phase IV, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ)

2. Joint Operational Capability and Rationale: ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

[REDACTED]

A. Gap Analysis: ~~(U)~~ Operational requirements in all mission areas have expanded and are exceeding the camp's capacity. These initiatives are imperative to support emerging requirements and position CLDJ to better support future operational needs.

B. Military Risk: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

3. Political-Military Implications: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

[REDACTED]

4. Force Structure and Management: ~~(U)~~ None.

5. Resource Implications: ~~(U)~~ U.S. Navy was assigned responsibility for CLDJ in 2007 and subsequently identified as the Lead Service for CLDJ in the 2012 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, the Enduring Location Master List, and a recent Resource Management Decision. However, important MILCON projects continue to be unresourced as CLDJ MILCON fails to be programmed within the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). With funding transitioning from the OCO to base budget in FY13, the lack of a program of record across the FYDP will have a negative impact with congressional support for essential MILCON investments.

6. Timelines and/or Milestones: ~~(U)~~ FY18; no 1391 developed for this project yet.


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7. **Evaluation of Alternatives/Joint Utilization:** ~~(U)~~ Several alternatives have been evaluated ranging from continued use of tents and containerized living units (CLU) to unified facilities criteria standards (UFC). Tents are considered inappropriate berthing for personnel assigned to the camp for periods of a year or longer. Life cycle costs for CLUs are almost as much as UFC options when health, safety, and force protection considerations are accounted for.

8. **Agreements:** ~~(U)~~ (b)(1)1.7e



9. **Project Detail:**



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

10. **ELML Change Nominations:** ~~(U)~~ None.

11. **Additional Comments:** ~~(U)~~ None.

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
~~(U)~~ APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN
PLAN 7000-12
HOST NATION AGREEMENTS BY COUNTRY

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


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(b)(1)1.4b




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~~(U)~~ APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX P TO CDRUSAFRICOM THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN 7000-12

TASKS TO THE COMMAND STAFF AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

1. ~~(U)~~ Introduction. The U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Theater Posture Plan (TPP) is an integral part of the USAFRICOM Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). This APPENDIX delineates tasks to the staff directorates, Service and functional components, and subordinate commands in order to develop and execute this TPP.

2. ~~(U)~~ Tasks to USAFRICOM's Staff. Inform Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of State (DOS), and host nations (HN) about USAFRICOM's network of required forward operating sites (FOS) and cooperative security locations (CSL) to ensure access and synchronize operations.

a. ~~(U)~~ Special Staff. Legal Counsel shall review TPP locations and agreements for those countries. Initiate changes or establish new agreements based on TPP requirements.

b. ~~(U)~~ Director for Strategy Plans and Programs, J5

(1) ~~(U)~~ Strategy Division shall author, develop, and coordinate TPP (in conjunction with TCP development/annual review) with command staff, Service and functional components, subordinate commands, other combatant commands, and Interagencies. Develop strategy for the establishment of a network of forward operating sites (FOS), and cooperative security locations (CSL) that support the TCP.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Plans Division shall provide basing requirements (locations and force requirements) supporting USAFRICOM's plans and concepts of operations. Develop future plans utilizing existing FOS-CSL network to the maximum extent possible.

(3) ~~(U)~~ Regional Engagement Divisions shall coordinate with country teams for the further development of the command's FOS-CSL network. In addition, coordinate with country teams for the stationing of rotational forces at FOSs and CSLs or designated operating locations. Coordinate with country teams for requirements outlined in Directorates' and components' supporting plans.

(4) ~~(U)~~ International Engagement Division shall coordinate with International Community on partnering capabilities with posture initiatives.

c. ~~(U)~~ Director for Operations, J3

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(1) ~~(U)~~ Future Operations Division shall provide basing requirements (locations and force requirements) supporting USAFRICOM's plans and concepts of operations. Develop future plans utilizing existing FOS-CSL network to the maximum extent possible.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Antiterrorism Division (J34) in coordination with J44 shall insure antiterrorism/force protection and Critical Infrastructure Protection (AT/CIP) considerations are addressed during force posture transformations and planning efforts. Additionally, coordinate with J45 during FOS/CSL development and assessments to insure transformations involving logistics planning efforts consider AT/CIP Risk Management.

d. ~~(U)~~ Director for Logistics, J4

(1) ~~(U)~~ Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (J43) shall coordinate distribution and sustainment requirements with J44 and J45. Coordinate requirements at air and sea ports of debarkation, FOSs, and CSLs (include maximum aircraft on ground) needed to support deployment and redeployment requirements.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Engineering Division (J44) shall coordinate force posture transformations involving infrastructure such as military construction (MILCON) planning, oversight of installation development, and related infrastructure planning efforts.

(3) ~~(U)~~ Logistics Support Division (J45) shall coordinate logistical capability assessments with Service components in the development of FOSs, CSLs, and CLs. Coordinate force posture transformations involving logistics planning efforts.

(4) ~~(U)~~ Medical Division (J47) will ensure health service support considerations are addressed during force posture transformations and planning efforts. J47 will provide strategic planning in conjunction with J5-REDs for health theater security cooperation activities.

e. ~~(U)~~ Director for Intelligence and Knowledge Development, J2

(1) ~~(U)~~ Provide analytical support as required to Theater Posture Plan development.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Identify collection requirements (locations and force requirements) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets supporting USAFRICOM operations and plans.

f. ~~(U)~~ Director for Resources, J1/J8

(1) ~~(U)~~ Comptroller Division shall review all expenditures (operations, training, and exercises) supporting USAFRICOM's TCP to include infrastructure costs associated with the FOS-CSL network.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Coordinate force posture transformations involving personnel reassignment and relocation. Provide adequate analysis of all impacts to include personnel, Quality of Life, Base Operating Support (BOS) manning, operational and maintenance costs (O&M), and infrastructure support for each posture issue.

g. ~~(U)~~ Director for Joint Force Development and Readiness, J7. Exercise Division shall review infrastructure requirements at FOSs and CSLs to support projected exercises.

h. ~~(U)~~ Director for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems, J6. Coalition Division shall coordinate communications support as needed to integrate the HN and DOS with the FOSs and CSLs that support the TCP.

i. ~~(U)~~ Director for Outreach / Strategic Communication, J93

(1) ~~(U)~~ Identify target audiences and desired effects, means of communicating or messaging, and means of assessing strategic communication plan effectiveness.

(2) ~~(U)~~ Synchronize command themes and messages to provide emphasis on the command's overall goals and to support Public Affairs and Information Operations informing priority key audiences.

(3) ~~(U)~~ Develop a Strategic Communication Annex Y, which includes audience analysis, themes and messaging.

3. ~~(U)~~ Tasks to USAFRICOM's Service and Functional Components.

a. ~~(U)~~ Commander, Air Forces Africa (CDRAFAFRICA)

(1) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

- ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e
- ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e
- ~~(C//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.7e

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(2) ~~(U)~~ Review and recommend additions or deletions to current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

b. ~~(U)~~ Commander, Naval Forces Africa (COMNAF)AF)

(1) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(2) ~~(U)~~ Review and recommend additions or deletions to our current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

c. ~~(U)~~ Commander, U.S. Army Africa (CDRUSARAF)

(1) ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
- ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

(2) ~~(U)~~ Review and recommend additions or deletions to our current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

d. ~~(U)~~ Commander, Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF). Review and recommend additions or deletions to current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

e. ~~(U)~~ Commander, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Review and recommend additions or deletions to current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

f. ~~(U)~~ Commander, Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA). Review and recommend additions or deletions to current posture based on component activities on the continent NLT 24 February 2013; recommend requirements for assured access agreements.

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