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1. Objectives

- a. Survey U.S. Embassy (USEMB) compound in order to:
 - i. Identify (b)(1)1.4.a routes to and from the airport
 - ii. Identify potential DoD support requirements
 - iii. Gather atmospheric data to assist DoD assets during (b)(1)1.4.a
 - iv. Review and Assess Emergency Action Plans (EAP) and identify gaps
 - v. Provide (b)(1)1.4.a brief to the Country Team
 - vi. Identify potential response force requirements
 - vii. Provide out brief to Country Team of findings, gaps, and recommendations

2. Timeline

- a. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso ASAT conducted 18-20 December 2019

3. Participants

- a. (b)(3)/(b)(6), USAFRICOM J335
- b. (b)(3)/(b)(6), USAFRICOM J335
- c. (b)(3)/(b)(6), SOCAF J33 Planner
- d. (b)(3)/(b)(6), SOCAF Communication Specialist
- e. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST)
- f. (b)(3)/(b)(6), SPMAGTF-CR-AF (b)(1)1.4.a, (b)(1)1.4c
- g. (b)(3)/(b)(6), SPMAGTF-CR-AF (b)(1)1.4.a, (b)(1)1.4c
- h. (b)(3)/(b)(6), SPMAGTF-CR-AF (b)(1)1.4.a, (b)(1)1.4c

4. Primary points of contact at USEMB

- a. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Senior Defense Official, Defense Attaché
- b. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Defense Attaché Office, Operation Coordinator

5. Engagements conducted during ASAT

- a. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Deputy Chief of Mission (Senior DoS representative*)
**Ambassador Andrew Young was on travel*
- b. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
- c. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Assistant Regional Security Officer
- d. (b)(3)/(b)(6), Management Officer

6. Overview

- a. Situation. Since 2018, Burkina Faso (BFA) experienced a dramatic increase in Violent Extremist Organization (VEO) attacks causing significant military losses in the Northern provinces and political unrest in the capital. As of May 2019, 55% of Burkinabés cited insecurity as the most significant issue in the country, which doubled from 2018. As of mid-October, local unions protested Ouagadougou's failure to contain the spread of VEO violence and its reliance on western military assistance. For the past 6-8 months, Ouagadougou has seen minimal VEO activity within the capital city limits while VEO activity simultaneously isolates the city from its periphery.
- b. Overall, the footprint held by the USEMB in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso is well protected. The security posture of the USEMB is fully updated with (b)(1)1.4.a Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment. As determined by the ASAT, inside of (b)(1)1.4.a of

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their arrival, a significant enhancement to the (b)(1) 1.4.a can be made. Additionally, it is estimated that the reinforcement element can easily integrate into the MSG security posture and is capable of (b)(1) 1.4.a

- c. Southwest of the Embassy are two abandoned buildings approximately 9 stories high which could (b)(1) 1.4.a and the southern portion of the Embassy. The Embassy's (b)(1) 1.4.a

- i. (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a It is located on the south side of the Embassy compound and (b)(1) 1.4.a




Figure 1: Primary Landing Zone

- d. The USEMB is closely tied to their (b)(1) 1.4.a, a team of approximately (b)(1) 1.4.a. Members of the ASAT observed them during a drill noting they were (b)(1) 1.4.a of the Embassy.

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- e. An (b)(1) 1.4.a wall on the north side of the embassy (b)(1) 1.4.a from the North. The perimeter wall is (b)(1) 1.4.a in certain areas.
- f. (b)(1) 1.4.a, the reinforcement element will (b)(1) 1.4.a
- g. The Embassy (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g
- h. The Embassy maintains (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g
- i. There is (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g within the Embassy compound via (b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4g
- j. The Embassy Medial Attaché, is a credentialed Family Nurse Practitioner. The (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a Ouagadougou International Airport has an Emergency Medical Technician and a Physician's Assistant.

7. Communications

- a. During a crisis, maintaining communications between the Embassy and any responding DoD unit is essential to understanding the events on the ground and to keep the GCC informed so that the commander can make the appropriate decision.
- b. (b)(1) 1.4.a was reachable through commercial ISP within the embassy. However, due to connectivity issues within the country, the embassy would need a room for (b)(1) 1.4.a. It would also need a router with (b)(1) 1.4.a to resolve the public IP to a private IP in the room.
- c. If a commercial ISP is lost or unavailable, Satellite Communications would be a viable option to reach the (b)(1) 1.4.a. The embassy would need a (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a.
- d. Both the (b)(1) 1.4.a back to the embassy via an (b)(1) 1.4.a. This is a viable emergency (b)(1) 1.4.a method should (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a.
- e. Should cell service and commercial ISP for the region go down, (b)(1) 1.4.a (b)(1) 1.4.a would be a viable option to communicate with an incoming aircraft. In the event of an emergency, the liaison to supporting forces would be able to bring a (b)(1) 1.4.a communications.

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8. Routes

- a. The (b)(1):1.4.a team conducted route reconnaissance of (b)(1):1.4.a locations. All Routes began from the (b)(1):1.4.a and were timed and calculated in both directions, to and from the (b)(1):1.4.a to each destination. Each route was traveled along recommended routes throughout the city to and from the (b)(1):1.4.a (b)(1):1.4.a
- b. US EMBASSY

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(b)(1) 1.4.a




(b)(1) 1.4.a




- C. (b)(1) 1.4.a route is a (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a route which basically runs east then north through the city center. The terrain throughout the city is generally flat with no elevation changes greater than 10 meters. The city is extremely arid with no rainfall during the survey period. The streets seem to

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be in generally good shape with few potholes and damage. Most streets have no curbing while several of the boulevards have a center curbed divider of approximately four (4) feet. There is little vegetation along the roadways on the outskirts of the city, however, in the city the streets are lined with large trees. Traffic lights are widely used throughout the city and it was observed that right hand turns on red light are not authorized. Caution needs to be taken at these stop lights since there may be a set of two (2) lights which control different flows of traffic.




d. Hazards and Choke points:




e. (b)(1) 1.4.a route is a (b)(1) 1.4.a
(b)(1) 1.4.a which basically runs (b)(1) 1.4.a

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- f. (b) (1)(A) route is a (b)(1):1.4.a route which runs (b)(1):1.4.a from the city center. This route will take you (b)(1):1.4.a of the International Airport. The terrain throughout the city is generally flat with no elevation changes greater than 10 meters.



- g. Hazards and Choke points:

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(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.g

- h. (b)(1) 1.4.a route is a (b)(1) 1.4.a route which runs (b)(1) 1.4.a from the city center. This route will take you (b)(1) 1.4.a of the International Airport.

(b)(1) 1.4.a

- i. Hazards and Choke points:

(b)(1) 1.4.a, (b)(1) 1.4.g

9. Transportation

- a. The Embassy can organically move (b)(1) personnel in (b)(1) 1.4.a. They have numerous SUVs available as well as (b)(1) 1.4.a.
- b. A (b)(1) 1.4.a would be required to transport more than (b)(1) 1.4.a. However, (b)(1) 1.4.a in a Crisis Response scenario.

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- c. The RSO will coordinate (b)(1)1.4.a support in the event the (b)(1)1.4.a
- d. There are (b)(1)1.4.a to accommodate (b)(1)1.4.a transportation to the (b)(1)1.4.a

10. Actions and Recommendations

- a. Per the survey, there are (b)(1)1.4.a scenarios in which the DoD would most likely provide support to USEMB Ouagadougou.
 - i. If an Embassy reinforcement is required, most likely the (b)(1)1.4.a. The primary recommendation is to maintain close coordination with the MSG and RSO to facilitate (b)(1)1.4.a prior to arrival. If the method of arrival will be via (b)(1)1.4.a the recommendation is for response force (b)(1)1.4.a in order to communicate with the response force aircraft from the primary and alternate command posts until the DoS procures (b)(1)1.4.a or similarly capable assets such as a (b)(1)1.4.a.
 - ii. In the event of a Military assisted departure, the same recommendation as above regarding assets capable of (b)(1)1.4.a with the response force aircraft is recommended. Additionally, (b)(1)1.4.a should be coordinated to maximize the efficiency of transportation of personnel to/from the (b)(1)1.4.a
 - iii. The response force medical teams should maintain familiarity with the embassy staff medical provider as well as the medical support located at the airport. This will maximize the efforts to integrate medical capabilities upon the arrival of a response force.
 - iv. Maintain the (b)(1)1.4.a. The location and size of this (b)(1)1.4.a is prime and will need to be maintained to ensure it can be utilized in the event of a reinforcement. Recommend exploring a (b)(1)1.4.a option to ensure that it remains (b)(1)1.4.a in the event it is needed on little notice.
- b. Communication observation: The (b)(1)1.4.a Wi-Fi signal (b)(1)1.4.a. This leaves the Ambassador's (b)(1)1.4.a.
- c. The Deputy Ambassador's (b)(1)1.4.a